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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
DAVID LOYOLA,

:

Case No. 890436-CA
Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This appeal follows the conviction of Driving Under the
Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44 (1953 as amended).

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a)(1953 as amended) and Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1953 as amended) whereby a criminal
defendant in the circuit court may take an appeal from a judgment of
conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals.

In this case, DAVID LOYOLA

was convicted at a bench trial before the Honorable Edward A.
Watson, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for Tooele County, State
of Utah.

Judge Watson rendered final judgment and conviction

against Loyola.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial judge err reversibly when he denied
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered from his detention
by the police on the grounds it was not supported by reasonable
suspicion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Loyola was charged by Information with Driving Under the
Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-44(1)(a)(1953 as amended).

He was found guilty of that charge

following a joint motion to suppress hearing and bench trial based
on stipulated facts on May 1, 1989.

Judgment and conviction was

entered by the Honorable Edward A. Watson of the Third Circuit Court
on June 1, 1989 and Loyola was sentenced to ninety days jail all
suspended but two days to be satisfied by twenty-four hours of
community service, to pay a $400.00 fine plus a $100.00 surcharge,
$100*00 victim restitution fund fee and $150.00 in alcohol education
costs, and to avoid any violations of the law for six months.
Loyola's motion for a certificate of probable cause was granted by
the trial judge and all conditions of his sentence were stayed
pending the outcome of the

appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 31, 1988, Henry White was working at the
Stansbury Park Golf Shop in Tooele County.
Transcript (M.T. 5 at 22-25).

(Motion to Suppress

He observed Loyola at the golf shop
- 2 -

and concluded that Loyola was drunk.

(M.T. 6 at 1-3). White

telephoned the Tooele County Sheriff's office after he observed
Loyola drive away.

(M.T. 6 at 13-15).

He told the dispatcher that

he believed the driver of the blue Mazda pick-up truck was
intoxicated and then left his name and address with the dispatcher.
(M.T. 6 at 16-17).

White did not observe Loyola driving in an

erratic or reckless manner.

(M.T. 18 at 14-16).

Trooper Kerwood received a radio call that someone at the
golf shop had reported that there was an intoxicated driver in a
blue Mazda pick-up truck with two barrels in the bed. (M.T. 6 at
23-25).

She stopped a vehicle matching the description in the radio

call in the Stansbury Park area.

(M.T. 7 at 2-3). After stopping

Loyola, she observed he had the odor of alcohol.

(M.T. 7 at 4).

She administered three field sobriety tests and formed the opinion
based on Loyola's performance that he was intoxicated.
5-9).

(M.T. 7 at

She placed Loyola under arrest and he agreed to take an

intoxilyzer test.

(M.T. 8 at 4-5). The test was performed

forty-five minutes later.
blood alcohol content.

(M.T. 9 at 4-6). The result was a .14

(M.T. 24 at 3).

The parties stipulated to the facts for purposes of the
defendant's motion to suppress and the trial.
1-2).

(M.T. 4 at 25, 5 at

After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found Kerwood had

reasonable suspicion to stop Loyola and denied defendant's motion.
(M.T. 23 at 17-20).

The court further found Loyola guilty of

Driving Under the Influence.

(M.T. 24 at 5-8).

- 3 -

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Loyola's motion to suppress should have been granted
because his detention was not supported by a reasonable suspicion he
was engaged or had been engaged in criminal activity.

The tip

received by the Tooele County Sheriff's office was conclusory and
not supported by specific, objective facts.

Thus, the conviction

should be reversed and the case remanded for suppression of evidence
flowing from the illegal stop.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

TROOPER KERWOOD'S DETENTION OF MR. LOYOLA
VIOLATED HIS RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Appellant challenged his initial detention by Kerwood.

It

is well settled that the Fourth Amendment applies to "investigatory
stops" or "seizures" that fall short of actual arrests.

State v.

Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968)).

In this case

the State stipulated that Kerwood stopped Mr. Loyola1s vehicle as he
was leaving the Stansbury Park area.

(M.T. 7 at 2.)

Consequently,

the trooper's actions are subject to constitutional strictures.

- 4 -

In Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22-23, 20 L.Ed, at 906, the
Court created an exception to the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.

Under Terry a police officer may detain a person

to conduct a brief investigation provided the officer possesses a
reasonable suspicion based on objective articulable facts that a
crime is being or has been committed.

l^d. Additionally, the tip of

an informant may be reliable enough to create reasonable suspicion
for a stop and frisk.

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct.

1921, 32 L.Ed. 612 (1972).

In Adams, the Court confronted the

question of whether the hearsay tip of an informant justified an
officer's frisk and seizure of a suspect.

The stop was upheld

because the officer knew the informant, the informant was subject to
perjury charges, the information was readily verifiable and the
neighborhood was a high crime-area.
617-618.

idL at 146-148, 32 L.Ed.2d

The general rule regarding when a tip constitutes an

articulable suspicion is that:
Informant's tips, like all other clues and
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may
vary greatly in their value and reliability. One
simple rule will not cover every situation. Some
tips, completely lacking in indicia of
reliability, would either warrant no police
response or require further investigation before
a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.
Id.

Therefore, an informant's tip may give rise to reasonable cause

only if it has sufficient indicia of reliability.

- 5 -

In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 105 S.Ct. 675, 83
L.Ed. 2d 604 (1985), the Court broadened the sources which the
government could draw on to uphold an investigatory stop.

Defendant

Hensley was stopped pursuant to a wanted flyer issued from another
state, and as a result of the stop, the police discovered he was
illegally in possession of a firearm.

The Court reasoned that if a

flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has
committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin
justifies a stop to check identification."

Ijd. at 232, 83 L.Ed.2d

at 614. The flyer was issued based on the detailed description of
an informant who participated in the crime and, accordingly, was
sufficiently reliable to arouse a reasonable suspicion.

Ij3. at 234,

83 L.Ed, at 615. The Utah Supreme Court employed the Hensley
rationale to uphold an investigatory detention based on a police
radio broadcast.

State v. Bruce, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah

1989)(broadcast placing orange car near the scene of robbery was
supported by reasonable suspicion justifying subsequent stop).
Applying Adams and Hensley to the instant case, the case
turns on whether Kerwood had a reasonable suspicion based on the
radio communication she received and the information received by the
dispatcher prior to the stop.

She did not.

The parties entered

into a stipulation of fact for purposes of both the motion to
suppress and the trial.

(M.T. 4 at 25, at 1-2). The relevant facts

are:

- 6 -

(1)

On August 31, 1988, White, an employee of the

Stansbury Park Golf Shop, telephoned the Tooele County Sheriff's
office to report an intoxicated driver driving away in a blue Mazda
pick-up truck with two barrels in the back.

(M.T. 5 at 22-25, 6 at

1-3);
(2)

White left his name and address with the dispatcher.

(M.T. 6 at 16-17);
(3)

White told the dispatcher he had suggested the driver

get a ride home;
(4)

Kerwood received a radio call that a citizen at the

Stansbury Park Golf Shop had reported an intoxicated driver drive
away in a blue Mazda pick-up truck with two barrels in the back.
(M.T. 6 at 23-25);
(5)

She stopped a vehicle matching the description of the

call about one mile from the Stansbury Park Golf Shop.

(M.T. 7 at

2-3);
(6)

She did not observe any driving pattern before the

stop and White did not relate one to the dispatcher.

(M.T. 7 at

2-3);
(7)
Loyola drink.

White did not tell the dispatcher the amount he saw
(M.T. 18 at 18-22).

Based on the stipulated facts, the trial judge found that
White was not known to be reliable.

(M.T. 21 at 16-18).

However,

he also found reasonable suspicion for the stop based on the
anonymous call because drinking drivers are so dangerous.
22).

(M.T.

The court then denied the motion and found Loyola guilty of

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

- 7
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(M.T. 23 at 17-20).

The information provided to Kerwood constituted a
conclusory allegation that Loyola was intoxicated.

However, a legal

investigatory stop must be supported by "articulated, objective
facts" then apparent to the officer.

Sandy City v. Thorsness, 115

Utah Adv. Rep, 28, 29 (Utah App. 1989) (citing, State v. Holmes, 774
P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989)) .
In Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W. 2d 552,
556 (Minn. 1985), for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court rescinded
the revocation of the defendant's drivers license on Fourth
Amendment grounds because the anonymous caller failed to provide any
specific and articulable facts to support the bare allegation of
drunk driving.

The court there noted "[if police cannot stop a car

on the highway on the basis of mere whim, neither can they stop on
the basis, for all they knew, of the mere whim of an anonymous
caller.w

icL

Informant White did not give any specific information

about how much Loyola drank, what his physical characteristics were,
or how he drove, Cf.

Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234, 83 L.Ed.2d at 615

(trial court concluded that a wealth of detail concerning the crime
reached by a culpable party created reasonable suspicion);

see,

e.g., State v. Newgard, 392 N.W. 2d 27 (Minn. App. 1986)(telephone
tip that a drunken man was stumbling near the highway provided
articulable facts on which to develop basis for investigatory
stop).

Moreover, White himself does not appear to have any indicia

of reliability.

He does not know what Loyola looks like sober as

- 8 -

compared to intoxicated;

C£. State v. Warren, 404 N.W.2d 895 (Minn.

App. 1987)(informant who lived with the defendant and knew he was
drunk on this occasion was a reliable informant), nor did the state
demonstrate that White has any familiarity with those who drink
alcohol.

Cf. State v. Lipinski, 419 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. App.

1988)(informant was particularly reliable in identifying those under
the influence because he was a doctor who treats alcoholics).
The only specific fact White revealed to the police was the
description of Loyola's car.

This fact does not rise to the level

of a reasonable suspicion that Loyola was driving under the
influence—just that he was driving.

State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842,

846 (Or. App. 1986), supports the proposition that a tip which
solely identifies a vehicle does not validate an otherwise illegal
stop.
In the instant case, the Tooele County Sheriff's office
received a tip that had little or no indicia of reliability.
Kerwood should have followed the advice of Adams to "further
investigate" before making a forcible stop of a suspect.

Adams at

147, 32 L.Ed.2d 618. There is nothing in the record which
demonstrates any particular exigency like heavy traffic or erratic
driving by Loyola.

Consequently, Kerwood's actions were not

supported by an articulable reasonable suspicion and Loyola's motion
to suppress should have been granted.
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POINT II,
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT THE MOTION
TO SUPPRESS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR,
An error requires reversal if it erodes a reviewing courts
confidence in the outcome of the trial.
913, 920 (Utah 1987).

State v.Knight, 734 P.2d

Absent the illegally obtained evidence the

State would have had none of Kerwood's observations of Loyola's
physical characteristics, his performance on field sobriety tests or
the chemical blood-alcohol result.
would wipe out the states's case.

The suppression of this evidence
Therefore, the error is

reversible.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Loyola respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his conviction and remand his case for dismissal.

Respectfully submitted this
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I

day of October, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING AND DELIVERY

I, L. CLARK DONALDSON, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midelton Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and
four copies mailed to the Tooele County Attorney's Office, Tooele
County Courthouse, 47 South Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074
this

2L

day of October, 1989.
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(1)(a)(1953 as amended provides:
(1)

(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical
control, or if the person is under the influence of
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

